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TAXMAN: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DODGES FIVE
BULLETS
Michael J. Zimmert
Twenty years ago I asked whether the Supreme Court would end the
Second Reconstruction in its decision in Bakke' and I predicted it would
not. When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Piscataway Township
Board of Education v. Taxman,2 the same issue was at stake. In face of
almost uniform predictions that affirmative action under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 would be severely narrowed, the parties settled
the case and took it off the docket of the Supreme Court.
3
The First Reconstruction began at the end of the Civil War with
passage of radical reconstruction legislation to transform the states of the
Confederacy and to protect the newly freed slaves.4 That reconstruction
ended with the Hayes-Tilden compromise of 1877 agreed to by the
political branches of government! The Supreme Court joined in with its
decision in the Civil Rights Cases6 in 1883. The Second Reconstruction
began after World War II with the decision in Brown v. Board of
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1. See Michael J. Zimmer, "Reverse" Discrimination: Will the Court Act to End the
Second Reconstruction?, 31 ARK. L. REv. 370 (1977). Then Solicitor General Wade
McCree cited the article to the Court in the oral argument of Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). See 46 U.S.L.W. 3249, 3253 (1977).
2. 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2506 (1997)
3. The settlement was reached on Friday, November 21, 1997. See Linda
Greenhouse, New Jersey School Move Leaves Affirmative Action in Limbo, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 22, 1997, at Al. The writ of certiorari was dismissed on December 2, 1997. See 118
S. Ct. 595 (1997) (mem.).
4. See generally THa FACTS OF RECONSTRUCTION (Eric Anderson & Albert A. Moss,
Jr. eds., 1991).
5. See C. VANN WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION: THE COMPROMISE OF 1877 AND
THE END OF RECONSTRUCTION 7-8 (1966).
6. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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Education7 and passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' The main thrust
of the Second Reconstruction has been to end de jure segregation and to
prohibit discrimination.
Part I of this Article will describe the law of voluntary affirmative
action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 up until Taxman.
Part II will trace the congressional reaction to the earlier attempt of the
present Supreme Court to end the Second Reconstruction with its 1989
civil rights decisions. It will address the significance to affirmative action
of section 116 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Part III will analyze the
approach to affirmative action taken by the Third Circuit in Taxman. Part
IV will show that Taxman is at best a quirky case to decide the fate of
voluntary affirmative action under Title VII. Part V will describe the
approach that the Supreme Court most likely would have taken in Taxman,
and Part VI will try to show why that approach would be wrong.
I. TITLE VII AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
In 1979, the Supreme Court found that in enacting Title VII's
prohibition of discrimination, Congress had not intended to prohibit all
voluntary affirmative action by employers. In United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber,9 a 5-2 majority upheld a collectively bargained
affirmative action plan designed to train unskilled incumbent workers of
Kaiser Aluminum to fill skilled jobs in the plant. Incumbent workers
would be accepted into the training program one for one, black and white
workers. Workers were chosen based on their plant seniority. Since black
workers at the plant generally had been more recently hired, they had less
seniority as a group than the incumbent white workers. Thus, some black
workers were accepted into the training program before some white
workers with more seniority. The plan was to continue until the
percentage of African-American skilled craft workers approximated their
percentage in the local labor force. Until this plan was adopted, the
employer had filled all its craft jobs by hiring new employees from a pool
of applicants who had prior craft experience. All the workers in the area
with craft experience were white because the craft unions in the area,
which provided the qualifying craft experience, excluded African-
Americans.
The Court held that Title VII did not prohibit a voluntary affirmative
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8. See generally MANNING MARABLE, RACE, REFORM AND REBELLION: THE SECOND
RECONSTRUCTION IN BLACK AMERICA, 1945-1982 (1984). See also D. Marvin Jones, No
Time For Trumpets: Title VII, Equality and the Fin De Siecle, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2311, 2317
(1994) (Second Reconstruction began with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
9. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
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action plan that was consistent with Title VII's objective of breaking down
"old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy." The affirmative action
plan at issue passed muster even in the absence of any suggestion that the
employer had itself discriminated against African-Americans. The plan
was
structured to "open employment opportunities for Negroes in
occupations which have been traditionally closed to them."
At the same time, the plan does not unnecessary trammel the
interests of the white employees. The plan does not require the
discharge of white workers and their replacement with new black
hirees.... Nor does the plan create an absolute bar to the
advancement of white employees; half of those trained in the
program will be white. Moreover, the plan is a temporary
measure; it is not intended to maintain racial balance; but simply
to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance."
Weber and its approach were reaffirmed in 1987 in Johnson v.
Transportation Agency." The case involved a man's challenge of the
employer's decision to hire the first woman into any of the employer's 238
different Skilled Craft Worker positions. The Court clarified Weber:
[A]n employer seeking to justify the adoption of a plan need not
point to its own prior discriminatory practices, nor even to
evidence of an "arguable violation" on its part. Rather, it need
point only to a "conspicuous... imbalance in traditionally
segregated job categories.'
'1 2
Justice O'Connor concurred in Johnson, saying she also agreed with
Weber. Her approach was to equate Title VII law with constitutional equal
protection. Thus, she said, "the proper initial inquiry in evaluating the
legality of an affirmative action plan by a public employer under Title VII
is no different from that required by the Equal Protection Clause. In either
case.., the employer must have had a firm basis for believing that
remedial action was required."' 3 For her, an affirmative action plan is
permitted by Title VII only if the employer can "point to evidence
sufficient to establish a firm basis for believing that remedial action is
required."'4  Evidence to support such a basis includes "a statistical
imbalance sufficient for a Title VII prima facie case against the
employer."'5 She then described Weber as consistent with the test she had
10. Id. at 208 (citations omitted).
11. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
12. Id. at 630.
13. Id. at 649 (citations omitted).
14. Id. at 650.
15. Id. at 650-51 (emphasis added).
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articulated:
The employer in Weber had previously hired as craftworkers
only persons with prior craft experience, and craft unions
provided the sole avenue for obtaining this experience. Because
the discrimination occurred at entry into the craft union, the
"manifest racial imbalance" was powerful evidence of prior race
discrimination. Under our case law, the relevant comparison for
a Title VII prima facie case in those circumstances-
discrimination in admission to entry-level positions such as
membership in craft unions-,is to the total percentage of blacks
in the labor force.
16
That there existed a prima facie case of discrimination against the
craft unions was very clear. The era was one in which some craft unions
explicitly excluded African-Americans and others used practices that
excluded them from membership. The unions' discrimination was not
discrimination by Kaiser Aluminum, the employer in Weber. Those craft
unions did not represent any of Kaiser's workers. The only link between
the unions and Kaiser was that, through their training programs, these
unions had created a pool of qualified craft workers from which Kaiser
hired the craft workers for its plant. Thus, Weber allowed Kaiser to use
affirmative action to break down old patterns of racial segregation and
hierarchy, even those not caused by its own discrimination.17 In other
16. Id. at 651.
17. Kaiser would not appear to have been at risk to a systemic disparate treatment claim
in its prior policy of hiring experienced craft workers. Absent some "smoking gun"
evidence that it used the policy of hiring skilled craft workers because it would produce an
all-white force of craft workers, the fact that all of its craft workers were white would not be
attributed to discrimination by Kaiser. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256
(1979), could be used to undermine any inference that it was Kaiser's discrimination that
caused the pool to be entirely white. Kaiser could point to the unions as the discriminators
and claim it had picked its craft workers "despite, not because" they were white. In short,
Kaiser was not guilty of intentional disparate treatment in the use of its policy of filling
skilled jobs with applicants who had prior craft training.
The remaining possibility for a prima facie case against Kaiser would be a disparate
impact case challenging Kaiser's practice of hiring only workers with craft experience.
Because the pool of potential employees was made up of only white craft union members,
the policy had a disparate impact on African Americans. The disparate impact theory is
premised on the notion that, as to the operation of its policies, an employer must take
account of general societal discrimination. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971), the Court required Duke Power to take account of societal discrimination to the
extent that effects of discrimination were imported into the workplace. Commenting on the
racial impact of the company's high school diploma and test prerequisites, the Court noted
that "[b]ecause they are Negroes, petitioners have long received inferior education in
segregated schools .... Congress has now required that the posture and condition of the
job-seeker be taken into account .... The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but
also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation." Id. at 430-31.
Disparate impact law mandates that employers take account of societal
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words, for Justice O'Connor, Title VII prohibits affirmative action if an
employer uses it to remedy the effects of past discrimination by other
actors in society. In saying that Weber involved the use of an employer's
own past discrimination as a justification for the use of affirmative action,
O'Connor is reaching beyond the facts and holding of Weber. In Weber
and Johnson, the Supreme Court found that affirmative action did not
violate Title VII despite the fact that the employer itself had not
discriminated in the past. To say it another way, Weber and Johnson did
not link the legality of affirmative action to the employer's discrimination,
no matter how Justice O'Connor described these cases. Taxman raised the
question whether an employer not shown to have discriminated itself can
use voluntary affirmative action to achieve education diversity without
violating Title VII.
II. THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO WEBER/JOHNSON
In Johnson, decided in 1987, the Court described the response of
Congress to its earlier Weber decision as one of acquiescence.
Congress has not amended the statute to reject our construction,
nor have any such amendments even been proposed, and we
therefore may assume that our interpretation was correct ....
Weber, for instance, was a widely publicized decision that
addressed a prominent issue of public debate. Legislative
inattention thus is not a plausible explanation for congressional
inaction."8
In 1989, the Supreme Court issued a series of decisions 9 that
amounted to such a massive restriction on the application of civil rights
law that those decisions have been characterized as an attempt to end the
Second Reconstruction."° Surprisingly, perhaps, no affirmative action
cases were decided among those decisions, so Weber and Johnson were
discrimination, at least to the extent that discrimination carries its effects into the
workplace. Consistent with that, voluntary affirmative action permits employers to take
account of that societal discrimination by using affirmative action to break down patterns of
segregation. Disparate impact law was codified in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
and has been criticized because of its close relation to affirmative action, or at least to
"quotas." See Kingsley R. Brown, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A "Quota Bill," A
Codification of Griggs, A Partial Return to Wards Cove, or All of the Above?, 43 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 287 (1993).
18. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 629 n.7.
19. See generally Linda L. Holdeman, Civil Rights in Employment: The New
Generation, 67 DENy. U. L. REv. 1 (1990).
20. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV.
1, 68 (1991) (describing the 1989 civil rights decisions of the Supreme Court as "the
equivalent of the Compromise of 1877, which ended the First Reconstruction") (footnote
omitted).
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not implicated.
The end of the First Reconstruction in the latter part of the nineteenth
century came once the Supreme Court joined the other two branches which
had already ceased to support it. In contrast, the present Court in its 1989
decisions preceded Congress, and possibly the President, in moving to end
the Second Reconstruction. Congress rebuffed this attempt. The Civil
Rights Act of 1991 overturned those decisions and restored civil rights
law, revitalizing the Second Reconstruction.
Since WeberlJohnson had not been directly affected by the 1989
decisions, Congress did not make any changes to that law. Congress
expressed something more than acquiescence but perhaps less than full
approval of Weber/Johnson. At a minimum, the 1991 Act gives the Court
no warrant to make any changes in Title VII's approach to affirmative
action. Section 116 is the only provision of the 1991 Act that speaks
directly to affirmative action,2' but what it says is less than fully clear.
Section 116. Lawful Court Ordered Remedies, Affirmative
Action, and Conciliation Agreement Not Affected.
Nothing in the amendments made by this title shall be construed
to affect court-ordered remedies, affinnative action, or
conciliation agreements, that are in accordance with the law.'
Stripped of all excess verbiage, section 116 says that nothing in the
1991 Act affects affirmative action that is in accordance with the law.2'
21. Two other sections of the 1991 Act arguably could have some effect on
Weber/Johnson. Section 106 deals with employment testing and makes it unlawful for an
employer "to adjust the scores of, use different cutoff scores for, or otherwise alter the
results of, employment related tests on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national
origin." Section 107(a) changes individual disparate treatment law by codifying the
plurality opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). Specifically, this
section changes the level of showing necessary to establish the employer's state of mind in
proving discrimination: "an unlawful employment practice is established when the
complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex or national origin was a
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated
the practice." Challengers to Weber/Johnson could try to apply these provisions to have
some effect on the law of voluntary affirmative action. The plain meaning of section 106
suggests that an employer can not shelter "race norming" of test scores, prohibited by
section 106, behind an affirmative action plan. Opponents of affirmative action might try to
stretch section 106 beyond its plain meaning. As to section 107(a), the "motivating factor"
language might be urged to somehow change the meaning of "discrimination" to exclude
voluntary affirmative action. Section 116 should work to forestall such arguments.
22. 102 Pub. L. No. 166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (1991) (emphasis added).
23. Even this restatement might be challenged because it could be argued that "court-
ordered" modifies "affirmative action" as well as "remedies." If so, section 116 would
speak to court ordered affirmative action but would say nothing about voluntary affirmative
action. The Report of the House Education and Labor Committee foresaw that
interpretative problem and proposed that section 211, which later became section 116, be
AFFIUTIVE ACTION DODGES FIVE BULLETS
The issue becomes what Congress meant by "in accordance with the law."
Did this amount to a reenactment of Title VII as construed by the Supreme
Court in Weber and Johnson or was Congress taking no position on that
body of law? Senator Kennedy said that section 116 reaffirmed Weber and
Johnson: "[T]he bill is intended not to change the law regarding what
constitutes lawful affirmative action and what constitutes impermissible
reverse discrimination." 24 The Congressional Record at one point supports
the view that the intent of section 116 is "to leave things the way they were
before passage of the legislation with respect to the legality of affirmative
action. '
In contrast, Senator Hatch said that section 116 took no position on
Weber and Johnson: "[The Act] expresses neither Congressional approval
nor disapproval of any judicial decision affecting court-ordered remedies,
affirmative action, or conciliation agreements including the Weber,
Johnson, Local [28], and Paradise Supreme Court decisions."26 Senator
Dole's statement supported the view of Senator Hatch,27 and President
Bush's signing statement incorporated Senator Dole's statement."
In section 116, a provision in which Congress told the Supreme Court
that its recent civil rights decisions were wrong and that the need for the
Second Reconstruction had not passed, there is no support to justify any
change in the law of voluntary affirmative action. Beyond that, by
speaking about affirmative action in section 116, Congress has gone
beyond the mere "silent or passive assent" connoted by the word
"acquiescence." 29  Whether or not section 116 amounts to a full
reenactment of Weber/Johnson, it is a statement recognizing the law in
those cases. Thus, under any view, section 116 bolsters Weber/Johnson
and the stare decisis effect that the courts should give to that law.
amended to say "otherwise lawful affirmative action, conciliation agreements and court-
ordered remedies." H.R. REP. No. 102-40() (Apr. 24, 1991). Even without the
amendment, the plain meaning of section 116 indicates that "affirmative action" includes
voluntary affirmative action. Otherwise, "court-ordered" would perforce modify
"conciliation agreements" as well as "remedies" and "affirmative action." Courts cannot
order parties to reach a "conciliation agreement," so that cannot be the plain meaning of
section 116.
24. 137 CONG. REc. S 15235 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991).
25. 137 CONG. REc. H9530 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991).
26. 137 CONG. REc. S15320 (Oct. 29, 1991). Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l
Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986), upheld court ordered affirmative action as a Title VII
remedy even though it benefited individuals who had not been the actual victims of
defendant's discrimination. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987), upheld court
ordered affirmative action plan instituting one-for-one promotions.
27. 137 CONG. REc. S15477-78 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991).
28. Statement of President George Bush Upon Signing S. 1745, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
768,769.
29. 1 THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 20 (Lesley Brown ed., 1993).
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Stare decisis is stronger in statutory cases than in constitutional ones,
since Congress can always act by legislation to overturn erroneous
statutory interpretations." The most recent statement of the Court on this
is Neal v. United States:
Our reluctance to overturn precedents derives in part from
institutional concerns about the relationship of the judiciary to
Congress. One reason that we give great weight to stare decisis
in the area of statutory construction is that "Congress is free to
change this Court's interpretation of its legislation." Illinois
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736, 97 S. Ct. 2061, 2070, 57
L. Ed. 2d 707 (1977). We have overruled our precedents when
the intervening development of the law has "removed or
weakened the conceptual underpinnings from the prior decision,
or where the later law has rendered the decision irreconcilable
with competing legal doctrines or policies." Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2370,
105 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1989) (citations omitted). Absent those
changes or compelling evidence bearing on Congress' original
intent, NLRB v. Longshoremen, 473 U.S. 61, 84, 105 S. Ct. 3045,
3058-59, 87 L. Ed. 2d 47 (1985), our system demands that we
adhere to our prior interpretations of statutes."'
Passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, overturning a series of
Supreme Court decisions deemed erroneous interpretations of various civil
rights statutes, is the most vivid example of why stare decisis is so strong
in statutory interpretation cases. It is no small irony that Taxman presents
this question of statutory interpretation of section 116 to the Court, since
section 116 was part of Congress' message to the Supreme Court that its
1989 decisions had seriously misinterpreted existing civil rights laws.
Those decisions helped trigger the recent renaissance in the field of
statutory interpretation. 2 The Supreme Court, however, has not been
receptive to these new approaches to statutory interpretation flowing from
that renaissance.3 It would be difficult, therefore, for the Court to be
credible if in Taxman it suddenly were to articulate a more fluid stare
decisis doctrine. Before we get to that, however, the stage needs to be set
by discussing what the Third Circuit did in Taxman.
30. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989).
31. 116 S. Ct. 763, 769 (1996).
32. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 273
(1994); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REv.
405 (1989).
33. See John Copeland Nagle, Newt Gingrich, Dynamic Statutory Interpreter, 143 U.
PA. L. REV. 2209, 2211 (1995) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994)).
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mH. THE THIRD CIRCUIT APPROACH IN TAXMAN
In Taxman, the school board decided to downsize by laying off one
teacher from its high school business education department. State tenure
law required layoffs by seniority. Two teachers, one African American
and one white, had exactly equal seniority and supposedly were exactly
equal in their other qualifications. Pursuant to its state-mandated
affirmative action plan, the school board decided to retain Debra Williams,
the only African American in the business department. Consequently, the
white teacher, Sharon Taxman, was laid off.
The en banc court, with eight of twelve judges joining in the majority,
found that the board's decision violated Title VII. While the majority
opinion is lengthy, quite convoluted, and claims merely to follow Weber
and Johnson, the decision in fact mirrors Justice O'Connor's concurrence
in Johnson. First, Title VII limited affirmative action to an employer's
remedying the present effects of past discrimination. "[U]nless an
affirmative action plan has a remedial purpose, it cannot be said to mirror
the purposes of the statute ....,3 Second, and this is the key change from
Weber, the court then limited that remedial purpose to an employer's
remediation of its own past discrimination:
The Board admits that it did not act to remedy the effects of past
employment discrimination. The parties have stipulated that
neither the Board's adoption of its affirmative action policy nor
its subsequent decision to apply it in choosing between Taxman
and Williams was intended to remedy the results of any prior
discrimination or identified underrepresentation of Blacks within
the Piscataway School District's teacher workforce as a whole.36
In Taxman, the Supreme Court was faced with the failure of the Third
Circuit to give stare decisis effect to Weber/Johnson. Justice O'Connor's
concurrence in Johnson, that Title VII law is the same as equal protection
and that Weber involved an employer remedying its own discrimination,
was not the opinion of the Court and should not be the basis for
overturning existing voluntary affirmative action law under Title VII. The
34. See Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1547.
35. Id. at 1557.
36. Id. at 1563. The court also relied on two additional grounds. First, the plan was
found to lack the necessary definition and structure. "IT]he Board's policy, devoid of goals
and standards, is governed entirely by the Board's whim, leaving the Board free, if it so
chooses, to grant racial preferences that do not promote even the policy's claimed purpose."
Id. at 1564. Second, the layoff of Taxman unnecessarily trammeled the rights of
nonminority employees: "the harm imposed upon a nonminority employee by the loss of
his or her job is so substantial and the cost so severe that the Board's goal of racial
diversity, even if legitimate under Title VII, may not be pursued in this fashion." Id.
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Supreme Court should apply stare decisis and reverse.3
IV. A QUIRKY CASE
One of the many things that made Taxman at least quirky, if not
bizarre, is that the United States government had, over the life of the case,
been on both sides and is now in the middle. The Bush Administration
Department of Justice initially brought the case against the school board
on behalf of Taxman. With the change of administration in Washington,
President Clinton's Justice Department attempted unsuccessfully to change
sides in the school board's appeal of Taxman's victory to the Third Circuit.
Instead, it was removed as a party." Once the Third Circuit affirmed and
certiorari was sought, the Supreme Court asked the government for its
input on whether certiorari should be granted. The government argued that
certiorari should not be granted. Nevertheless, the Court decided to hear
the case. Most recently, the Solicitor General filed a brief on the merits
arguing that the Third Circuit decision was wrong but that the judgment
nonetheless should be affirmed.
The defendant also appeared in some ways to be less than a fierce
advocate of affirmative action. It wass in the position of having to defend
an affirmative action plan that it may never have really supported. The
affirmative action plan was required by the state and so its adoption was no
more than the board doing what it was told. That may account for the fact
that the school board relied upon affirmative action only once in a layoff,
and that was in its decision to retain Williams.39 In defense of its decision
to layoff Taxman, the school board apparently conceded that Williams and
Taxman had equal qualifications. In fact, Williams has a masters degree in
business education and Taxman does not.' If Williams was more qualified
than Taxman, then the layoff decision should have been made in Williams'
favor without need to rely upon affirmative action. Hindsight is better
than foresight, but conceding such an important point did not leave the
37. A more supportable ground for affirmance was that the employer's plan lacked
sufficient definition and structure. See Kenneth R. Kreiling & Thomas D. Mercurio,
Beyond Weber: The Broadening Scope of Judicial Approval of Affinnative Action, 88 DICK.
L. REV. 46, 107 (1983) (failure to have sufficiently articulated a plan is major ground to
disallow an employer's voluntary affirmative action).
38. Not only did the parties change, but so did the judges. The original panel of the
Third Circuit to hear the case was composed of Judges Hutchinson, Mansmann and McKee,
but Judge Hutchinson passed away between oral argument and resolution of the appeal.
Chief Judge Sloviter was then designated to serve in place of Judge Hutchinson on the
reconstituted panel.
39. See Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1575 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
40. See Kathy Barrett Carter, Teacher in Court Test Sees a Matter of Degree, THE STAR
LEDGER (New Jersey), Sept. 24, 1997, at 1.
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school board with its strongest defense.41 Having used affirmative action
only once to retain Williams, the school board then rescinded its plan.
More surprising was that Taxman is a Title VII case. Just before the
facts of this case unfolded in May 1989, the Supreme Court decided City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co.42 In Croson, a majority of the Court
finally agreed that strict scrutiny applies to equal protection challenges to
affirmative action by state and local governmental actors. Thus, the best
strategy to successfully challenge Taxman's layoff, if that were the goal,
would be equal protection, not Title VII. Yet Taxman was not brought on
equal protection grounds but rather under Title VII. The Third Circuit's
explanation for this curious choice of litigation strategy is that the statute
of limitations had run on Taxman's equal protection claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 when the action was commenced. That begs the question of how
the Department of Justice, which brought the case, could let the statute of
limitations run if its primary interest was to protect Taxman's civil rights.
It may be that the Department viewed the case more as a vehicle to change
Title VII law than as an action primarily aimed at vindicating Taxman's
rights.4
In sum, the initial advocates representing Taxman may not have been
strongly committed to her best interests. The school board, in addition,
hardly seemed to be a strong advocate of affirmative action. This case
may have lacked the concreteness present in a truly adversarial situation.
Had the decision of the Third Circuit been affirmed, that result would
have been at odds with one policy predilection of the present Supreme
Court. In his massive study and critique of the textualist, plain meaning
approach to statutory interpretation of the present Supreme Court, a study
largely based on the Court's 1989 civil rights decisions, Professor William
Eskridge concludes that "[t]he Court's civil rights decisions from 1989 to
1991 do not represent its adherence to plain meaning. Instead, they
represent its preference that civil rights statutes not 'intrude' into employer
decision making ... ."' The approach of the Third Circuit in Taxman had
just the opposite effect. It expanded the scope of application of Title VII
41. The school board, of course, may just have thought that it was easier to declare the
candidates equal and then claim to be using affirmative action than to announce that
Williams was more qualified than Taxman. School districts and other civil service
employers may have strong reasons to avoid evaluating the merits of incumbent employees
out of fear that any adverse action taken against an employee would have to be justified
under a cause standard. Affirmative action probably is commonly used as an explanation to
disappointed applicants, even when that is not the actual basis for an unfavorable decision.
42. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
43. See Taxrman, 91 F.3d at 1552 n.5.
44. Plaintiff's counsel in Johnson had made the same decision to go with Title VII and
not equal protection when both were available.
45. ESKRIDME, supra note 32, at 273.
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by outlawing more employer actions as discriminatory. It is no wonder
then that the Third Circuit failed to even discuss one articulated purpose of
Title VII, which is to minimize legal interference in the managerial
discretion of employers. The Court in Weber, citing the Congressional
Record,46  emphasized that "management prerogatives.., be left
undisturbed to the greatest extent possible." 47 Thus, it would be ironic if
the Supreme Court had affirmed Taxman, since that decision would be
boldly activist in overturning stare decisis by a Court that claims to reject
judicial activism. That would result in a substantial expansion in the
burden the law places on the private sector, another outcome often abjured
by this Court.4
The settlement of the case, which took it off the docket of the
Supreme Court, has its own quirky aspects. That civil rights organizations
pushed for the settlement, including contributing significant amounts of
money to achieve it,49 symbolizes the change in the role of the federal
courts in civil rights enforcement: These groups now see it important to the
achievement of their goals that cases be kept out of the Supreme Court."
46. See H.R. REP. No. 88-914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt.2, at 29 (1963).
47. Weber, 443 U.S. at 206. There is also some irony in Taxman for many of us who
came to the law in the 1960s because of Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and
the perception that law could be used expansively to transform society for the better, to
increase the role of the law in order to increase justice and equality. We are the ones now
arguing in Taxman to let voluntary employer affirmative action be free of judicially created
legal restraints. See Jeffrey Rosen, The New Look of Liberalism on the Court, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 5, 1997, § 6 (Magazine), at 60.
48. In one other area the present Supreme Court has chosen to value a market free of
legal rules over another value that is perceived as important to it-the federalism value of
state governmental actors to act with fewer constraints of national law. In C & A Carbone,
Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1683 (1994), the Court, under the Dormant
Commerce Clause, applied strict scrutiny on the basis of some hypothetical disparate impact
on out-of-state business interests to overturn a town's decision to engage in a turn-key
transaction for a solid waste treatment facility, with the town's contribution to be made by
requiring that all solid waste in the town be taken to the local facility. Requiring all the
waste to be treated locally had an adverse impact on all solid waste facilities elsewhere,
including those outside the town and outside the state, but that seems hardly sufficient to
justify the restraint on the discretion of local governments dealing with garbage.
In another area, the Court claimed to be supporting broader authority in state
governments but actually overturned the exercise of that authority. In New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), the Court revived the Tenth Amendment as a vehicle to protect
state sovereignty. But in doing so, it struck down an agreement of all the states on how to
treat low-level nuclear waste that Congress had accepted under its power in Article I,
Section 10, Clause 3, to approve compacts among the states. Justice White noted in his
dissent: "The ultimate irony of the decision today is that in its formalistically rigid
obeisance to 'federalism,' the Court gives Congress fewer incentives to defer to the wishes
of state officials in achieving local solutions to local problems." Id. at 210 (White, J.,
dissenting).
49. See Linda Greenhouse, supra note 3.
50. See Barry Bearak, Rights Groups Ducked a Fight, Opponents Say, N.Y. TIMES,
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That is a complete reversal of the goal of those organizations during the
days of the civil rights movement. A further twist is that these civil rights
organizations were helped by contributions from major corporations." Big
business and civil rights organizations would surely have been perceived
as strange bedfellows in the not too distant past. But now they share
interests in preserving affirmative action.
The final ironic twist to Taxman is that, in some ways, it is both the
best and the worst case to discuss affirmative action. Keeping the faculty
of a high school business department racially integrated with one African-
American teacher provides a good reason to support affirmative action in
this era when educational policy should be striving in every possible way
to keep students achieving in school. Presenting role models for African
Americans is not insignificant. Integration of a faculty is of value for the
education of white students because it permits them to see African
Americans in leadership roles. Based on this, Taxman would seem to be a
good case to reaffirm Weber and Johnson.
Another argument that Taxman is the best case for affirmative action
is that the case does present the question in the abstract whether race can
be taken into account when all else is equal. Given that the record
concludes all else is equal between the two candidates and that the
principle of stare decisis in its strongest form, whatever decision the Court
would have made would clearly reveal its view of the continuing reality of
discrimination against African Americans, the discretion the Court is
willing to grant to social, political, and economic actors to deal with that
problem, and its policy determination of how legitimate affirmative action
is when all else is equal. There is no cover in the case for the Court to hide
behind issues that are frequently involved in the debate about affirmative
action, such as lowering standards, benefiting unqualified workers, and
other issues.
The government argued that Taxman is the worst case to decide the
continuing viability of Title VII's affirmative action law because it
involves a layoff. Yet, Taxman did not lose her job permanently or even
for very long. She had statutory recall rights which worked to bring her
quickly back to teaching in the business department at the high school.
Had the school board not conceded that Taxman was as qualified as
Williams, and the reviewing court had found Williams more qualified,
Taxman would have lost her case, because the use of race would not be
implicated in her layoff. Even conceding that affirmative action was used
to retain Williams, all Taxman lost was what would have happened if
affirmative action had not been used; she lost the right to have the decision
Nov. 22, 1997, at Al.
51. See Abby Goodnough, Financial Details Are Revealed in Affirmative Action
Settlement, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 6, 1997, at B5.
1998]
242 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 1:1
made by chance, a coin flip, a 50/50 chance of not being laid off. This is
not to say that there was no adverse effect on Taxman, but, instead, that the
impact was minimal. It is very hard to characterize this impact on just one
worker as "trammeling" the interests of Taxman, much less those of white
employees in any more general sense.
V. PREDICTING THE OUTCOME
Early during my clerkship with a federal appeals court judge,52 the
Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari in a case in which the judge
had written the opinion. His immediate reaction---"They don't grant cert.
to affirn"--would be, he said, the universal reaction of appellate court
judges. So why predict that this maxim would not apply to Taxman and
that the decision would be affirmed, not reversed? The answer lies, of
course, in the affirmative action/equal protection decisions handed down
since Johnson was decided in 1987.
A. Equal Protection
It took the Court seventeen years for a majority to agree on a
conceptual structure to review affirmative action under the Equal
Protection Clause. In 1978 in Bakke, the Court was split 4-4-1 on the
University of California-Davis Medical School admissions program.
Basically, the program reserved sixteen seats in the entering class for
minority applicants, leaving the remaining eighty-four seats open to
competition by all applicants. Without the Court agreeing on the level of
scrutiny to be applied, the program was struck down based on Justice
Powell's swing vote. He thought strict scrutiny applied and that the
separate track for minority admissions that Cal-Davis used was
unconstitutional, but that affirmative action plans that used minority group
membership as a "plus" for admission-the "Harvard model"--would be
constitutional if done to serve the goal of educational diversity.
Eleven years later in 1989, a bare majority of the Court in Croson
finally agreed that strict scrutiny applied to the affirmative use of race by
state and local governments in actions brought under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.53 In 1990, again by a 5-4 majority,
the Court distinguished Croson as limited to state actors and upheld a
congressionally enacted affirmative action plan for broadcast licenses in
Metropolitan Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC by using intermediate-level
52. Judge Thomas E. Fairchild of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
53. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-95.
54. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
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scrutiny. Finally, in 1995, another bare majority in Adarand5" overturned
Metropolitan Broadcasting and held that strict scrutiny applied to the
affirmative use of race by all governmental actors, local, state and
national: "all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or
local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under
strict scrutiny."56 Further, the Court gave a thumbnail description of how
strict scrutiny was satisfied: "[racial] classifications are constitutional only
if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling
governmental interests. 57
The Adarand majority is itself split as to what strict scrutiny means.
Justice Thomas, in his concurrence, takes the most extreme position,
calling for an absolute color-blind standard:
[The government may not make distinctions on the basis of
race. As far as the Constitution is concerned, it is irrelevant
whether a government's racial classifications are drawn by those
who wish to oppress a race or by those who have a sincere desire
to help those thought to be disadvantaged."
By saying that no governmental actor may ever make distinctions
based on race, Justice Thomas appears to be suggesting that violations of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may not be
remedied because such a remedy would violate his absolute color-blind
standard. The argument would be that, since courts are governmental
actors, courts cannot use race any more than any other governmental actor.
To grant a remedy to the victim of a defendant's race discrimination would
be to make a distinction on the basis of race and, as such, would violate his
color-blind rule of equal protection.
Justice Scalia's concurrence is not quite so extreme but would limit
the use of race by governmental actors to providing remedies to actual
victims of race discrimination.
55. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
56. Id. at 227. In another line of cases dealing with provisions of the Voting Rights
Act that require the conscious use of race in drawing election districts, the Court has
recently rejected redistricting plans because they used race to maximize minority
representation among elected officials. See Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 1906 (1996);
Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1964 (1996). These decisions raise the specter that
Congress, in enacting those provisions of the Voting Rights Act, exceeded its power under
the enforcement provisions of the Civil War amendments. Finally, a majority of the Court
in City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2164 (1997), found the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act to be beyond the powers of Congress under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court limited the power of Congress under that provision to the creation
of remedies but did not permit Congress to define the substantive meaning of Section One,
because doing so is within the province of the Supreme Court.
57. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
58. Id. at 240 (Thomas, I., concurring).
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[G]overnment can never have a "compelling interest" in
discriminating on the basis of race in order to "make up" for past
racial discrimination in the opposite direction. Individuals who
have been wronged by unlawful racial discrimination should be
made whole; but under our Constitution there can be no such
thing as either a creditor or a debtor race."'
The other three Justices in the majority, Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist, would allow for a somewhat
broader use of race as consistent with the strict scrutiny test. In her
opinion for the Court, Justice O'Connor tried to "dispel the notion," based
on the views of Justices Scalia and Thomas, that
strict scrutiny is "strict in theory, but fatal in fact." ... The
unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects
of racial discrimination against minority groups in this country is
an unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified from
acting in response to it.60
Recent Supreme Court authority suggests which governmental
interests are compelling and which are not. In Shaw v. Hunt,6' a Voting
Rights Act case, Chief Justice Rehnquist described how race could be used
by a governmental actor to remedy discrimination where the beneficiaries
of the use of race were not themselves victims of discrimination.
A State's interest in remedying the effects of past or present
racial discrimination may in the proper case justify a
government's use of racial distinctions. For that interest to rise
to the level of a compelling state interest, [the governmental
actor] must satisfy two conditions. First, the discrimination must
be "identified discrimination." ... Second, the institution that
makes the racial distinction must have had a "strong basis in
evidence" to conclude that remedial action was necessary,
"before it embarks on an affirmative-action program."
62
Remedying the present effects of past discrimination has been
recognized as a compelling governmental interest even if that remedy
benefits those who themselves have not been the victims of the
governmental actor's discrimination. In United States v. Paradise,3 the
Court upheld a quota remedy for promotions--one African American for
each white-against the Alabama state police. This came after many years
during which the state police failed to implement any remedy for having
engaged in hiring discrimination against African-Americans.
59. Id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
60. Id. at 237 (citation omitted).
61. 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996).
62. Id. at 1902-03 (citations omitted).
63. 480 U.S. 149, 185 (1987).
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In contrast, governmental actors are prevented by strict scrutiny from
using race to remedy general societal discrimination unconnected to their
own present or past activities. In 1986 in Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education,' the Court indicated that it "never has held that societal
discrimination alone is sufficient to justify a racial classification." 65 More
recently, in Shaw v. Hunt, the Court made clear that remedying general
societal discrimination is not a compelling governmental interest that
would justify race conscious governmental action: "an effort to alleviate
the effects of societal discrimination is not a compelling interest."
In sum, the present Supreme Court's interpretation of equal protection
requires that all uses of race, even affirmative action, by all governmental
actors must satisfy the strict scrutiny test. Two elements make up that test.
First, the purpose for the use of race must be a compelling governmental
interest. Ameliorating discrimination by providing a remedy to the actual
victims of an actor's discrimination as well as remedying the present
effects of such discrimination by a governmental actor, even if the
beneficiaries of the remedy were not themselves its victims, satisfies the
compelling governmental interest test. Redressing general societal
discrimination does not. There are, of course, other possible governmental
interests, such as diversity, which a majority of the present Court has not
yet characterized as either compelling or not. The second element of strict
scrutiny requires the governmental actor to identify the discrimination and
to have "'a strong basis in evidence' to conclude that remedial action was
necessary."67 If the governmental actor has that evidence identifying the
discrimination, then the actual use of race must be narrowly tailored to
serve the identified compelling governmental interest without
unnecessarily trammeling the rights of the majority.
In light of that recent Supreme Court precedent, the lower federal
courts are finding that only a quite narrow range of affirmative action
survives under strict scrutiny and its compelling governmental interest test.
First, one court has rejected the diversity rationale for the use of
affirmative action that was articulated by Justice Powell back in Bakke. In
Hopwood v. State of Texas,6 the Fifth Circuit struck down the affirmative
action admissions plan of the University of Texas Law School. Like the
Cal-Davis admissions plan in Bakke, the University of Texas Law School
used a separate admissions track for minority candidates. In concluding
that the educational diversity purpose was not a compelling governmental
interest, the Fifth Circuit observed that the opinion of Justice Powell in
64. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
65. Id. at 274 (1986).
66. Shaw, 116 S. Ct. at 1903 (citation omitted).
67. Id. (citation omitted).
68. 78 F.3d 932, 951 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
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Bakke did not command the assent of any other member of the Court.
Further, even if Justice Powell had spoken for the Court at that time, Bakke
was decided before a majority of the Court determined that all affirmative
uses of race by governmental actors must satisfy strict scrutiny. While
diversity among the student body might be a legitimate and even an
important governmental interest, the Hopwood court found it was not a
compelling one.69 In short, Bakke did not survive Croson and Adarand.
Second, even assuming a compelling governmental interest for the
use of race is shown, the courts have strictly applied the "narrowly
tailored" test that requires the affirmative use of race to be closely linked
to the governmental interest its use is intended to serve. In Podberesky v.
Kirwan,70 the University of Maryland acknowledged its history of
intentionally excluding African Americans from its student body, only
ending that policy after Brown v. Board of Education. Nevertheless, for a
very long time after de jure exclusion had ended, very few African-
Americans applied or attended the university. Numerous attempts to
increase African-American enrollment had only marginal effect.
Eventually, the university created a scholarship program for high
achieving African-American applicants and students.
The Fourth Circuit struck down the program for falling to satisfy the
strict scrutiny standard. First, given the time since de jure segregation had
ended, the university was unable to identify that any present effects of its
past discrimination still existed. All it could show was the existence of
general societal discrimination rather than any present effects of the
university's own actions in the past. Such general societal discrimination
could not be the basis for the use of affirmative action since remedying
societal discrimination is not a compelling governmental interest. Second,
even assuming some effects of the university's past discrimination still
existed, the university was not able to prove that the scholarship program
for high achieving African-American students was narrowly tailored to
remedy whatever that discrimination was.7'
B. Importing Equal Protection Into Title VII
The significance of the equal protection decisions to Taxman and
Title VII law is that this equal protection law will be imported into and
made applicable to Title VII. In fact, the Court has a model for doing this
69. All of the discussion of diversity might be dicta since the University of Texas Law
School had segregated its admissions tracks and did not use race as a "plus" in the way that
Justice Powell in Bakke accepted as consistent with the diversity interest.
70. 956 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2001 (1995).
71. This issue was not resolved by the Court. See 956 F.2d at 57 n.7.
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in Adarand7 2  There, the Court imported Croson's equal protection
approach, applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, into
the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, which is applicable to the activities of the federal
government.
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Adarand identifies "three general
propositions with respect to governmental racial classifications" 73 as: (1)
skepticism about any governmental use of race; (2) consistency in
application to all races; and (3) congruence, so that equal protection
doctrine is the same under both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. All
three propositions led to the importation of equal protection doctrine from
the Fourteenth into the Fifth Amendment. "[The Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution protect persons, not groups. It follows
from the principle that all governmental action based on race... should be
subjected to detailed judicial inquiry so that the personal right to equal
protection of the laws has not been infringed." 74
The application of the Adarand analysis to Title VII would be
straightforward. Title VII has been construed to protect all persons, blacks
and whites, from race discrimination. Using Justice O'Connor's three
propositions-skepticism, consistency and congruence-could, therefore,
lead to the application of equal protection strict scrutiny to voluntary
affirmative action under Title VII, just as it led Justice O'Connor to import
Fourteenth Amendment doctrine into the Fifth Amendment in Adarand.
Further, in Johnson, Justice O'Connor already said the analysis of
affirmative action under Title VII is the same as equal protection. While
straightforward, that application is wrong. What makes it wrong is that
these three general propositions are in fact so broad and open-ended that a
majority of the Court would be giving itself wide discretion to impose its
own personal and political values. Those values appear to be blind to our
history of having fought a Civil War to end slavery and to the significant
legal consequences of that war that still have relevance today.
VI. CIvIL WAR DENIAL
It is one thing, as the present Court has done, to deny the usefulness
of legislative history in interpreting statutes because that history is subject
to strategic uses by self-interested parties. But denying the history of our
country is quite another. Saying that consistency requires the application
of equal protection doctrine is exactly the same way to blacks and to
72. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227-3 1.
73. Id.
74. Id. (alteration in original).
75. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278-85 (1976).
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whites is an awesome denial of this country's history of slavery and race
discrimination against African Americans. Saying that consistency
requires that the claims of "reverse" discrimination brought by whites be
tested by the same standard as the claims of invidious race discrimination
brought by African Americans is all the more significant, given Justice
O'Connor's admission in Adarand that race discrimination against
members of minority groups continues to exist to this day: "The unhappy
persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial
discrimination against minority groups in this country is an unfortunate
reality .... ,76
Congruence requires, according to the Adarand majority, that the
federal government be seen as no different that the states in terms of its
role in protecting civil rights. Justice O'Connor's descriptions of
Hirabayashi v. United States" and Korematsu v. United States,78 dealing
with the sorry treatment of Japanese Americans during World War II, are
sobering, and do justify skepticism. They are sobering not just because the
national government treated citizens as criminals solely based on their
Japanese ancestry, but also because the Court failed to stop that invidious
race discrimination. That the Court failed to exercise judicial review when
it should have in that situation does not, however, justify the Court using
such abstract propositions as consistency in unwarranted judicial activism
now. Failing to analyze real differences between blacks and whites with
regard to the impact of race discrimination, and not recognizing real
differences between the federal government and the states in being
empowered to redress that discrimination, is no better than the Court's
failure in Korematsu.
State property law permitting African Americans to be enslaved was
the central issue in the Civil War.79  The Thirteenth Amendment
overturned that body of law, and the broader Fourteenth Amendment
overturned the fundamental structural error of the original Constitution
that treated the states as only protectors and never the predators of
individual rights. 0
76. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237.
77. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
78. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
79. See James McPherson, The Heart of the Matter, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Oct. 23, 1997,
at 35 (arguing that recent scholarship establishes conclusively that slavery was the heart of
the matter at stake in the Civil War).
80. Adarand is not the only case where the Court appears to deny the legal
consequences of the Civil War. In New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), the
majority opinion relied on our history to support revivifying the Tenth Amendment. In
dissent, Justice White decried the inadequacy of that history as "wooden" and "elaborate
window dressing" because it denied the fact that the Civil War had legal consequences:
With selective quotations from the era in which the Constitution was adopted,
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The Court should recognize the lack of congruence between
constitutional equal protection and federal statutory law such as Title VII
based on differences in stare decisis. Stare decisis is weaker as to
constitutional decisions than as to statutory interpretations because of the
greater difficulty in overturning a wrong constitutional decision than in
changing an erroneous interpretation of a statute through a statutory
amendment." So, assuming a majority of the present Supreme Court
thinks that Weber and Johnson were wrongly decided, still the proper
response of the Court should be to recognize that Congress is the
appropriate governmental body to make any changes in the law.
It may be that the use of the terms "skepticism," "consistency" and
"congruence" are meant to evoke the judicial process approach in vogue
during the era in which the present members of the Court came to the law.
If so, Justice O'Connor left out the most significant term of that approach:
the majority attempts to bolster its holding .... I do not read the majority's
many invocations of history to be anything other than elaborate window
dressing .... Moreover, I would observe that, while its quotations add a
certain flavor to the opinion, the majority's historical analysis has a distinctly
wooden quality. One would not know from reading the majority's account, for
instance, that the nature of federal-state relations changed fundamentally after
the Civil War. That conflict produced in its wake a tremendous expansion in
the scope of the Federal Government's law-making authority, so much so that
the persons who helped to found the Republic would scarcely have recognized
the many added roles the National Government assumed for itself .... While I
believe we should not be blind to history, neither should we read it so
selectively as to restrict the proper scope of Congress' power under Article I,
especially when the history not mentioned by the majority fully supports a more
expansive understanding of the legislature's authority than may have existed in
the late 18th century.
New York, 505 U.S. at 207 n.3 (White, J., dissenting).
81. See Lawrence C. Marshall, "Let Congress Do It": The Case for an Absolute Rule
of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. RPv. 177 (1989). Stare decisis only comes into play
when a court is convinced an earlier decision was wrong. "In the [rule of statutory stare
decisis'] purest form, a court invoking stare decisis refuses to reverse a statutory precedent
even though the court is quite convinced that the earlier decision was wrongly decided." Id.
at 186.
82. Presumably the collapse of the threat of world communism has reduced the
centripetal force uniting our nation behind a strong national government. That may reflect
the change in balance between those centripetal forces drawing us together and centrifugal
forces pulling us apart that can be seen in the renaissance of federalism, see New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), and the narrowing of power of the national
government, see City of Boerne v. Fores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997); United States v. Lopez,
115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). Even granted the militia movement, the Oklahoma City bombing
and white male backlash against civil rights, nothing seems quite so dramatic to the survival
of our constitutional system as the threat of renewed civil war that led to the Hayes-Tilden
compromise of 1877. See generally WOODWARD, supra note 5. The Court might be
required to sacrifice stare decisis to the need to maintain our form of government. See John
J. Gibbons, Intentionalism, History, and Legitimacy, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 613 (1991).
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"purposive." A Court which fails to take account that the purpose of equal
protection was to protect slaves freed by the Civil War83 simply does not
understand what "consistency" and "congruence" should now mean.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Court attempted to end the Second Reconstruction in its 1989
civil rights decisions. It failed because Congress intervened with the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The Court already has read that
Act narrowly8 and continues to narrow antidiscrimination legislation in
cases not directly implicating the 1991 Act's amendments. These
decisions echo the Court's view over one hundred years ago in The Civil
Rights Cases.6 There, less than twenty years after the Civil War, Justice
Bradley suggested that the problems of slavery and discrimination were
over and that the civil rights legislation of the First Reconstruction was no
longer needed.
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of
beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable
concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the
progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere
citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and
when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in the
ordinary modes by which other men's rights are protected.8
The Court was wrong in 1883 in believing the problems caused by
slavery were solved. It will be wrong now to cast aside Weber and
Johnson. We must wait for Congress to speak on affirmative action.
While it seems unlikely that the present Congress would amend Title VII if
the Supreme Court had affirmed Taxman, that does not in any way
legitimate the violation of stare decisis. Basically, the decisions of the
Court in Weber and Johnson put the question of whether the law of
voluntary affirmative action should be changed into the hands of Congress.
It is for Congress, not the Supreme Court, to decide whether the time for
voluntary affirmative action under Title VII has passed.
83. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
84. See Landgraf v. ASI Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994) (Act did not apply
retroactively).
85. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) (fact that defendant's
explanation for firing plaintiff is not true does not mandate finding of discrimination);
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 113 S. Ct. 1701 (1993) (discharging employee
to prevent pension vesting is not evidence of age discrimination).
86. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
87. Id. at 25.
88. Pending in the House is the Civil Rights Act of 1997, H.R. 1909, 105th Cong.
(1997), which would end affirmative action in federal employment.
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The fact that the Supreme Court decided equal protection cases to
create a different approach to affirmative action under the Constitution
does not authorize the Court to overturn established Title VII law under
stare decisis. Applying Adarand to Title VII is possible because Adarand
is such a broad and unformed standard that it leaves open to judicial
discretion any policy choice a majority of the Court decides appropriate.
Given that stare decisis applies in its strong form to Weber and Johnson,
and the stark nature of the question in Taxman-when all else is equal, can
affirmative action be used?-an affirmance on all but the narrowest
grounds in Taxman would have been rightly criticized as impermissible
judicial activism, a majority of the Court acting as lawmakers, not judges.
When the rollback of civil rights by the Supreme Court's decisions in
1989 is put together with a possible affirmance in a case like Taxman, the
policy predilection of the Court could be equated with the policy
prescription of a recent controversial book, The End of Racism.9 In it, the
author describes racism as existing today in two forms. First, there is the
"rational" racism of whites reacting against the conduct of many African
Americans living in a "dysfunctional" culture. That rational racism will
disappear when African Americans conform their culture, and therefore
their conduct, to majority norms. The continued cutback in civil rights law
by the Supreme Court, even after Congress rebuffed that cutback with the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, seems consistent with D'Souza's view that law
need not be much involved any more in ending racial discrimination
against African Americans. The second form of racism that D'Souza sees
today is affirmative action; that is, discrimination against whites. If the
Court imposes strict scrutiny in Title VII, it will virtually eliminate
affirmative action as a tool to counter societal discrimination and will
vindicate the views of those, like D'Souza, who see affirmative action as
invidious discrimination.
The open-ended principles of consistency and congruence could be
applied by the Court in a wide variety of situations. Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,90 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972," and
Executive Order 11,246 all are vulnerable to the extent they require or
permit affirmative action. Even if a different Congress amended Title VII
to explicitly codify Weber and Johnson, that legislation itself might be
vulnerable to constitutional attack as beyond the power of Congress to
89. DnMSH D'SoUZA, THE END OFRACISM (1995).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1978) (prohibiting race discrimination against recipients of
federal money).
91. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1982) (prohibiting sex discrimination against recipients of
federal money).
92. 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1964) (affirmative action required of government
contractors).
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enforce the Fourteenth Amendment under Section Five of that
Amendment93 and beyond the power of Congress to regulate commerce.
94
Lining up the parade of horribles does not mean they will come to
pass. But the Court, through its judicial activism, effectively may prevent
private actors, the states, and the federal government from legally using
affirmative action to remedy general societal discrimination. If the Court
had affirmed Taxman, it would be ignoring stare decisis, thereby suffering
a loss of legitimacy. It is not the same, but how close will that come to
Dred Scott v. Sandford,95 where the Supreme Court took slavery off the
political agenda and thereby helped set the stage for the disastrous Civil
War that followed?96
The settlement of Taxman does not mean that the Supreme Court will
not reach the issue of the continuing validity of affirmative action under
federal civil rights statutes. It did, however, delay the Court's deciding
that issue.97
93. See City of Boeme, 117 S. Ct. at 2157 (Religious Freedom Restoration Act beyond
power of Congress under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment).
94. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (Gun-Free School Zones Act
beyond power of Congress to regulate commerce).
95. 60 U.S. (How.) 393 (1856) (Missouri Compromise unconstitutional because
Congress could not grant citizenship to slaves or their descendants).
96. Neil Gotanda, in A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," supra note 20, at
68, states:
[A] parallel [exists] between the modem civil rights movement and the "first"
Reconstruction; the Supreme Court's civil rights decisions of 1989 are the
equivalent of the Compromise of 1877, which ended the first Reconstruction.
By fixating on formal race and ignoring the reality of racial subordination, the
Court, in this second post-Reconstruction era, risks establishing a new
equivalent of Plessy v. Ferguson. There is, however, a second parallel for the
Court. The greater danger for the current Court is that it will face the loss of
legitimacy which confronted the Taney Court after Dred Scott (citation
omitted).
97. See Steven A. Holmes, Rights Settlement May Only Have Forestalled Major
Decision, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1997, at A15.
